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REGULATION ON SETTING TECHNOLOGY 
STANDARDS UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY 
LAW OF JAPAN 
ERIKO WATANABE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  Recent Trends 
On December 14, 2000, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the 
competition authority in Japan, announced a clearance allowing a single joint 
venture company to manage and grant licenses of the standardized 
technology for the next generation telecommunications system for mobile 
phones known as the “3G Patent Plathome.”1 This was the first case in which 
the JFTC formally publicized its analysis under the Antimonopoly Law2 with 
regard to the setting of technology standards in a specific case.3  
In recent years, more and more researchers have conducted joint research 
and development projects aimed at setting technology standards, with many 
of the projects currently under review to determine their worldwide 
feasibility.4 Under these circumstances, the JFTC has just begun its analysis 
  Attorney-at-law and Partner, Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu, Tokyo, Japan. 
 1. According to the JFTC, nineteen mobile phone manufacturers and telecommunications 
companies have contributed the patents essential for the development of the next generation system of 
mobile phones, the “3G Patent Plathome.” The contributing companies wanted to incorporate a jointly 
owned company to control and manage the developed technologies as well as grant licenses with 
unified terms and conditions to third parties. The JFTC provided clearance for the arrangement on the 
basis that there would be no anticompetitive effects either in the relevant product market or among the 
standardization of technologies. Thus, the JFTC admitted that there are, in principle, pro-competitive 
effects from setting the technological standards. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n (Dec. 
14, 2001), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp. 
 2. The Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act 
No. 54 of 1947 [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law], reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). 
 3. In 1999, the JFTC approved the joint research and development activities of welding material 
manufacturers that possessed a dominant market share to enable them to develop standards for the 
recyclable packaging of welding materials. The JFTC’s reasoning was simple: the products in question 
were merely packaging materials, and the manufacturers’ joint activities would not affect the welding 
materials market directly. See Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Jigyousha no Katsudo ni kansuru Soudan 
Jireishu [Report on the Activities of Entrepreneurs Presented for Prior Consultation] (Mar. 2000) 
[hereinafter Activities Report].  
 4. For example, several automobile manufacturers jointly developed the next generation 
automobile using fuel cells and fuel cell products. See FUJI RESEARCH INST. CORP., THE FUTURE OF 
THE FUEL CELL, vol. 126 (Feb. 21, 2000). 
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as to how the Japanese Antimonopoly Law treats the setting of technology 
standards, and a study group consisting primarily of academics who 
specialize in competition or intellectual property law published its report on 
the subject on July 25, 2001.5 To date, there do not appear to be any court 
precedents that discuss the analysis under the Antimonopoly Law with regard 
to setting technology standards.  
B.  Scope 
There are two major categories of technology “standards”: (1) de facto 
standards, or those that private firms develop and adopt within a particular 
industry, and (2) de jure standards, or those adopted/regulated by public 
organizations and governments.6  
There are two different types of de facto standards. One de facto standard 
is for technology that a single firm principally develops and achieves, and 
that survives competition from other technologies to become the standard in 
a given industry. While a firm may enjoy monopolistic profits from setting 
such standards, only an undertaking that utilizes a full range of a given 
industry’s necessary technologies and also has ample funds and resources 
actually will achieve this goal.  
The other type of de facto standard is a technology standard that several 
firms (undertakings with either a horizontal or vertical relationship) jointly 
developed to set the standard in a given industry. There are several incentives 
to the joint development of standards. First, from the viewpoint of the firms 
jointly setting the standards, it is not necessary for each individual firm to 
have either a full range of the necessary technologies and intellectual 
property or the ample financial support required to develop the technologies. 
In fact, it likely will become more and more difficult for a single firm to 
single-handedly develop the technology that may become the standard in a 
given industry—in particular, a standard for a completely new product. For 
example, the development of new automobile equipment requires a wide 
 5. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Technology Standard and Competition Policy 
(July 25, 2001), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp. The Activities Report discusses problems raised by 
the activities that set de facto standards, as well as issues that arise after setting those standards. See 
Activities Report, supra note 3, at 27. The Activities Report also discusses potentially illegal conduct 
by firms, including false statements to consumers regarding the status of the developed standards. Id. 
For example, if a participating firm intentionally hides specific intellectual property (e.g., patents) and 
then refuses to license rights to the hidden intellectual property after the establishment of the 
technology standards, the refusal would violate the Antimonopoly Law as an unfair trade practice. Id. 
 6. See FUKUTARO WATANABE & TORU NAKAKITA, SEKAI HYOJUN NO KEISEI TO SENRYAKU 
DE JURE SUTANDADS NO BUNSEKI [CREATION AND STRATEGY OF WORLDWIDE STANDARDS: STUDY 
ON DE JURE STANDARDS] (2001). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/12
p263 Watanabe book pages.doc  10/15/02   11:22 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] REGULATION ON SETTING TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS OF JAPAN 265 
 
 
 
range of knowledge and experience to produce the various products and 
components that will be incorporated in or connected to the automobile 
navigation system. While there may be some exceptions, it is unlikely that a 
single company will have the requisite technologies and knowledge to 
expertly produce all of these products and components. Moreover, a single 
company may not be able to obtain the necessary titles and licenses of the 
vast amount of intellectual property rights and technologies in order to 
conduct adequate research and development and completely avoid 
infringement. 
Second, the firms may diversify their risk by saving time and costs for 
research and development, and avoid taking all or nothing by pursuing the 
technologies with the other firms that have expertise in various areas.  
Third, standardized technologies allow the manufacturers to use common 
parts and components and thus achieve economies of scale and lower 
manufacturing costs.  
Fourth, the joint setting of standards enables the interchangeability of 
systems and equipment that were not originally interchangeable. Complexly 
combined systems and products that require connectivity or seamless 
subsystems and/or components in turn require expertise in particular areas to 
develop new technologies. 
The advantages of setting standards accrue not only to firms but to 
consumers as well. For instance, consumers may no longer purchase the 
products from the firms that adopted the non-standard technology, if one of 
the technologies in a given industry becomes the standard. Those firms that 
manufacture the products using the non-standard technology and fail to 
update their technology to meet the standard may have to withdraw from the 
given industry. If, for example, the manufacturer of a particular type of 
computer software must cease production for some reason, there likely will 
be accumulated data rendered inaccessible for future use. If interchangeable 
software using the same standardized technology could access such data, 
consumers may avoid the switching costs required in such a situation. 
Furthermore, there are certain products and services such that the more 
consumers use the product or service, the more the product improves and is 
widely spread. 
More importantly, such joint activity for setting standards may create new 
products, which ultimately could lead to the creation of new markets.  
Based on the perception that setting standards not only promotes 
consumer benefits but also may have pro-competitive effects, I will discuss 
next the joint setting of technology standards by plural firms (undertakings 
with either a horizontal or vertical relationship) under the Antimonopoly 
Law. 
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II. ANTITRUST CONCERNS OF THE SETTING OF TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS 
BY PLURAL FIRMS 
A. Anticompetitive Effects 
Although the joint setting of technology standards by plural firms may 
have potentially pro-competitive effects, there may be resulting 
anticompetitive effects as well. One such antitrust concern is the exclusion of 
other firms from a particular technology or product market, and the 
subsequent evaporation of competition from that market. Furthermore, if one 
of the participating companies possesses dominant power in a particular 
product or technology market, other companies with products or technology 
used in combination with the dominant company’s product or technology 
may hold the same power as the dominant company in another 
product/service market. While such holding of a dominant position itself 
would not violate any provision of the Antimonopoly Law, if dominant 
companies abuse their power by excluding other companies’ products or 
technology, their actions may violate the Antimonopoly Law as a private 
monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade, or unfair trade practice.7  
Another concern is that the standards, once adopted, may function to fix 
the current technologies as the standard, thereby preventing or inhibiting the 
development of new technologies. However, this concern will prove to be 
relatively less serious as long as the competition in the products and 
technologies based on such standards is maintained,8 for in many industries 
new technology was developed despite the existence of de facto standards 
(e.g., the development of the “Game Cube” by Nintendo, “PlayStation” by 
Sony Entertainment, and “X-Box” by Microsoft).9 
B. The Effect of Products and Services on Competition 
The JFTC’s announcement on December 14, 2000, discusses the 3G 
Patent Plathome, for which the joint participants developed a market that 
they would control through a jointly owned company. In most cases, 
however, multiple markets relevant to the standardized technologies are 
 7. See Activities Report, supra note 3, at 20. 
 8. See infra Part II.C. While it is important for the JFTC to secure competition among 
technology standards, it should not prohibit all restrictions, as firms likely would lose the incentive to 
conduct future research and development. Rather, the JFTC should allow certain restrictions for a 
defined, finite period so long as the restrictions will not impede competition and the joint activities will 
not violate the Antimonopoly Law as unreasonable restraints of trade. See infra Part III.C.  
 9. See WATANABE & NAKAKITA, supra note 6. 
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closely related to each other, and therefore the effects on the competition in 
such markets must be reviewed. For example, assuming that there is an 
advanced car navigation system jointly developed by automobile 
manufacturers, computer manufacturers, monitoring system integrators, car 
part/component manufacturers, and a telecommunications company that have 
expertise in each area, this system has a good chance to become the 
technology standard in the given industry and will be protected by 
intellectual property rights. In assessing this new technology under the 
Antimonopoly Law, effects on the competition in each area must be 
reviewed. Namely, while we should examine the competition in the market 
for the jointly developed car navigation systems first, we also should 
consider the effects on the competition in the markets of each product (e.g., 
automobiles and computers) and the resulting products (i.e., the market for 
automobiles with car navigation systems) (if any).  
This assessment does not necessarily mean that the activities for setting 
standards of technologies should not be allowed under the Antimonopoly 
Law, even if exclusive use of the standardized technologies by participating 
companies may affect competition adversely in certain products. In other 
words, unless there is open access for the products and services related to the 
products that require the standardized technology, competition in the markets 
for the products and related products will be affected directly or indirectly 
depending on the combination of, and the dependency between, the products 
in question.10 
C. Competition in the Technology Market 
It is a basic and common understanding that the joint activities of plural 
firms for setting technology standards must not impede competition in the 
technology market. On the other hand, it would be difficult for the JFTC or a 
court to find the firms’ joint activities for setting standards (i.e., mere 
activities without involving the conduct after the development of 
standardized technology) to be in violation of the Antimonopoly Law solely 
based on the possible anticompetitive effects on the technology market for 
the following reasons:  
1. Unless the manufacturers that possess and refuse to license certain 
important intellectual property rights in the existing technologies of a 
 10. The competition for equipment and/or parts that will be incorporated in such car navigation 
kits also should be examined. If only certain components manufactured by particular suppliers can be 
incorporated into the kits, then competition in those component parts will be affected. 
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product participate in the joint activities, potential competition in the 
technology market will remain.  
2. Furthermore, in many cases, at least at the time the participating 
manufacturers commence the joint activities, uncertainty exists as to 
whether the joint activities will create new technology successfully 
and whether such results eventually will become the industry standard 
to the point that joint research and development activities must be 
ceased beforehand. 
3. While the competition between the various standards must be 
protected to a practically reasonable extent, from the perspective of the 
consumer, the competition in the products manufactured or services 
provided based on standardized technology may be more important. 
Requiring open access to standardized technologies may remove the 
more serious anticompetitive concerns regarding the competition in 
the products or services, except where firms use joint activities to 
exclude particular firms from the market in question. 
III. ANALYSIS UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN EACH PHASE OF THE 
JOINT ACTIVITIES 
A. Joint Activities for Setting Standards 
If the firms conduct joint activities for setting standards, such activities 
may constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair trade practice 
under the Antimonopoly Law.11 In addition, the activities of an organization 
 11. The Antimonopoly Law prohibits three general types of activities: private monopolization, 
unreasonable restraints of trade, and unfair trade practices. If a single firm (or multiple firms working 
together) substantially restrains the competition in a particular industry by controlling or excluding 
others from the market, the conduct will violate the Antimonopoly Law as a private monopolization. 
See Antimonopoly Law § 3. Joint activities among competitors (actual or potential) that substantially 
restrain competition in a particular field of trade constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade 
prohibited under the Antimonopoly Law. Id. Unfair trade practices are defined in Section 2(9) and are 
prohibited under Section 19.  
 
 Guidelines published by the JFTC provide that joint research and development activities may have 
pro-competitive effects and therefore are subject to a rule of reason analysis. See Fair Trade Comm’n, 
The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and Development (Apr. 20, 1993), 
available at http://www.jftc.go.jp [hereinafter Joint Research and Development Guidelines]. The 
guidelines also indicate that joint research and development activities among competitors may 
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade if the research and development conducted by each 
individual participant would be restricted and competition in the relevant market would be affected to 
a substantial degree. Id. In addition, under the Antimonopoly Law Guidelines Concerning the 
Activities of Trade Associations, the activities of a trade association in establishing standards will not 
be prohibited under the Antimonopoly Law if the trade association complies with consumer interests, 
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that manages and controls the developed technologies may constitute a 
private monopolization under the Antimonopoly Law. 
While Section 21 provides that the provisions of the Antimonopoly Law 
do not apply to activities recognized as an exercise of the rights under the 
Patent Law,12 Utility Model Law,13 Design Law,14 or Trademark Law,15 
according to the Guidelines for Patent and Know-how Licensing 
Agreements,16 the JFTC interpreted Section 21 to hold that those activities 
that are not deemed to be a proper exercise of such rights may contravene the 
provisions relating to private monopolization, unreasonable restraints of 
trade, or unfair business practices. Based on this interpretation, Section 21 
may not excuse the joint activities of plural firms for setting technology 
standards if anticompetitive effects are foreseeable. 
The JFTC will analyze and make a determination of the anticompetitive 
effects of joint research and development activities (i.e., whether such 
activities will restrain competition substantially in the relevant market), 
taking into account the following factors set forth in the Joint Research and 
Development Guidelines published by the JFTC on April 20, 1993: 
(a) The number of participants in the joint activities and their 
individual market shares; 
(b) The character of the research (whether the given project has a 
direct or indirect impact on the competition in the product market); 
 (c) The necessity of joint research and development; and  
(d) The scope and duration of the joint activities.17 
does not discriminate against certain members, and does not force members to comply with established 
standards. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines Concerning the Activities of Trade Associations Under 
the Antimonopoly Law, 12 LAW IN JAPAN 118 (1979). 
 12. Japanese Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, reprinted in 6 EHS Law Bulletin Series Japan 
SA-A11 (1966). 
 13. Jitsuyo Shinan Ho [Utility Model Law], Law No. 123 of 1959. 
 14. Isho Ho [Design Law], Law No. 125 of 1959. 
 15. Shohyo Ho [Trademark Law], Law No. 127 of 1959. 
 16. Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines for Patent and Know-how Licensing Agreements Under the 
Antimonopoly Act (July 30, 1999), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp [hereinafter Guidelines for 
Licensing Agreements]. 
 17. See Joint Research and Development Guidelines, supra note 11. The guidelines provide that 
research and development activities could be problematic under the Antimonopoly Law if: (1) the 
participants’ aggregate market share exceeds the 20% safe harbor; (2) the activities are essential to the 
development of technology linked to standardization within a particular industry; (3) there are 
restrictions upon which firms may participate in the research and development; or (4) the activities 
ultimately restrict the ability of any business to remain in the relevant market. Id. 
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Although the guidelines reinstate the JFTC’s understanding of the rule of 
reason approach, they also express the JFTC’s concerns about the effects of a 
possible market foreclosure caused by patent pooling and cross-licensing.18 
However, if there is open access at the time of the development of such 
technology, there is no reason to prohibit the firms from conducting the joint 
activities to set the technology standards. Even more important is the issue of 
how to secure fair and reasonable terms and conditions for the open access. 
B. The Participation/Contribution and Selection of Participants 
Under the Antimonopoly Law, if parties unreasonably refuse the 
participation of, or discriminate against, other firms (such as by refusing to 
admit a firm into a trade association), such a refusal or discrimination may 
violate the Antimonopoly Law as either an unreasonable restraint of trade or 
an unfair trade practice.19 It is impractical and impossible, however, to 
require that all firms desiring to participate in joint activities conduct research 
and development for setting standards due to the capacity of their facilities or 
abilities. In general, if one reasonable and clear-cut criterion for selecting 
participants exists, and open access to the standardized technologies is 
allowed to actual and potential competitors, selection of participants itself 
will not raise any serious antitrust issues under the Antimonopoly Law by 
requiring the criterion. 
We must consider the reasons why a company desires to participate in the 
joint activities or organization. One important incentive for participation in a 
research and development joint venture is to gain an advantage by acquiring 
knowledge, experience, and technology from other firms. In addition, the 
timing of firms in becoming acquainted with the technology in question is 
important. If only the participating firms are prepared at the time the 
technologies are licensed to third parties, or participating firms capture 
customers before licenses are prepared, open access to the standardized 
technologies and pro-competitive effects become meaningless. Therefore, we 
should consider more seriously the time schedule of the license as well as the 
participants’ activities.  
 18. See Guidelines for Licensing Agreements, supra note 16, Part I.3. 
 19. Organization to make decisions with regard to the participation in the research and 
development as well as the technology appropriate for standardization within the relevant industry will 
be necessary. The rules and processes for making the decisions will need to be as reasonable and fair 
as possible to avoid problems under the Antimonopoly Law. 
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C. Freedom of Non-Participation 
Although any owner of technology should allow access if it is empathized 
that such access is necessary for the national economy, a refusal to license 
the technologies by the owner should not, in principle, be problematic under 
the Antimonopoly Law. 
If the agreement between the firms participating in the joint activities 
unreasonably restricts withdrawal by a firm, the agreement may impede the 
competition among setting the standards by firms (or group firms) and 
thereby violate the Antimonopoly Law as an unfair trade practice. On the 
other hand, if participants may withdraw freely from such an agreement and 
may remove their contributed technologies at any time, the joint activities for 
setting standards immediately face difficulties. In practice, there appears to 
be a common understanding that although a firm may withdraw with 
appropriate prior notice, it is reasonable if the firm is required to license its 
contributed technologies that are necessary to continue the joint activities on 
a non-exclusive basis. Such a non-exclusive licensing arrangement is 
justifiable for the purpose of the joint research and development activities, 
and likely would not be problematic under the Antimonopoly Law. 
D. Ownership and Management of the Standardized Technologies  
Typically, developed technologies necessitate management by a certain 
organization, which renders certain types of patent pools unavoidable. 
Although patent pools can have a pro-competitive effect, patent pools 
themselves may constitute a private monopolization. For example, if patent 
holders competing in a market for a type of products form a patent pool and 
consequently agree to pool all existing and future improved technologies in 
the patent pool, and if they refuse to grant licenses to new entrants or specific 
existing entrepreneurs without justifiable reasons, their actions may 
constitute a private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade, or unfair 
trade practice.20 
E. License and Use of Standardized Technologies 
Considering the essential facilities doctrine, the key element of joint 
activities for setting technology standards by plural firms is to secure open 
access to the technologies for third parties (including authorized competitors 
 20. See Guidelines for Licensing Agreements, supra note 16, Part I.1. 
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of participating firms), so long as the refusal to access excludes potential and 
actual competitors.21  
Practical problems concern the scope, terms, and conditions upon which 
the organization either must allow or may reject access, and it is a common 
understanding that the terms and conditions under a license agreement, 
including a possible royalty for the licenses, must not be a de facto obstacle 
for licensees to obtain such licenses.22 If the licensor requests such an 
unreasonably high royalty that it would exclude competitors from obtaining a 
license, then the licensor’s actions may constitute a private monopolization in 
violation of the Antimonopoly Law. However, the essential facilities doctrine 
is not necessarily the solution. Unless the terms and conditions are 
determined beforehand, it will not work in a practical sense. In addition, 
another problem concerns the type of cease and desist order that the JFTC or 
the court may issue to secure open access. The solution to this does not seem 
to exist under the current framework of the Antimonopoly Law.  
The Activities Report points out that the entity operating or managing the 
technologies may abuse the decision-making process so that particular firms 
are treated either favorably or unfavorably. The Activities Report therefore 
suggests that the JFTC secure a fair process to determine technology 
standards, which subsequently should include the participation of an 
independent and nonpartisan supervising third party.23 
F. Potential Collaboration Between Competitors 
Research and development activities that aim to set industry standards 
may require the exchange of information regarding both technical and market 
information such as market trends, customer needs, and other product 
information. Under the Antimonopoly Law, the exchange of business 
information may be problematic if there is an implicit agreement between 
competitors. Nevertheless, it is difficult to distinguish the information 
required for the setting of standards and allowed under the Antimonopoly 
 21. According to the essential facilities doctrine discussed in Japan but not yet discussed in court 
precedents or JFTC decisions, if plural firms are going to set technology standards jointly, and if 
refusing access to third parties to the technology potentially could exclude competitors, then the plural 
firms must provide open access to third parties to the resulting technologies.  
 22. The firms should review the specific terms and conditions of the license under both the Joint 
Research and Development Guidelines and the Guidelines for Licensing Agreements in terms of the 
JFTC’s review. For example, non-disclosure obligations imposed on either licensees or participants in 
the research and development activities that would not be problematic during the term of the 
agreement may constitute an unfair trade practice once the term is complete if they are not reasonably 
necessary to subsequently protect the confidentiality of the technology.  
 23. See Activities Report, supra note 3, at 24. 
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Law from the information that would be problematic if exchanged. In order 
to avoid such antitrust risks, participating firms should establish an 
independent corporation or organization as well as internal firewalls between 
participating staff members to avoid external concerns that the independent 
organization is a cartel if competitors are involved. In addition, it is necessary 
for the firms’ legal counsel to continuously monitor the firms by requesting 
reports on a continuous basis as to the existence of spill-over effects or 
ancillary restraints that would be problematic under the Antimonopoly Law. 
IV. THE NECESSITY OF NEW ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES  
The Antimonopoly Law authorizes the JFTC to take any measures 
necessary to eliminate illegal activities,24 which literally can be interpreted 
such that the JFTC has the power to order the relevant parties to grant 
compulsory licenses to third parties.25 It seems, however, that the JFTC has 
never issued such orders. The JFTC seems to believe the issuance of such 
orders may be beyond the scope of its authorization or ability. In fact, the 
decision to grant the license, and upon what terms and conditions, requires 
expertise in both the subject areas of the technologies in question and the 
business practices within the particular industry. In addition, the more joint 
activities that firms conduct, the greater the expertise in the wide range of 
technologies and business practices in various industries that will be 
necessary.26   
The procedural issues for the open access as described above also should 
be discussed because it seems difficult for the JFTC or the courts to make a 
determination on the appropriate terms and conditions under the current 
procedures. It may be necessary to create completely new procedures by 
which the party seeking a license and the party refusing to license must abide 
once the refusal is held to violate the Antimonopoly Law.27 
 24. See Antimonopoly Law §§ 7, 20. 
 25. See Activities Report, supra note 3, at 37. 
 26. The Patent Law contains provisions that authorize the Patent Office (Tokkyo-cho) to 
determine whether a patent owner is required to license a patent in certain exceptional cases. These 
provisions have not been used as a matter of practice, although the reasons are not clearly identified. 
 27. Moreover, joint ventures to set technology standards now are conducted worldwide by firms 
that have many different nationalities and locations. In addition, such activities may have a significant 
impact on the markets of each country. While such an impact may well depend upon each country’s 
business environment and competition laws, a uniform, or at least similar, standard of review will be 
important to standardize. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
In summary, the key issues related to the setting of standards by plural 
firms under the Antimonopoly Law are (1) securing, as a scheme and as a 
matter of practice, open access to the standardized technologies and lead time 
for the introduction of the standardized technologies to maintain the 
competition of the product/service market for which the standardized 
technologies are used as well as the competition to set the standards, and (2) 
discerning how to evaluate fair and reasonable terms and conditions that will 
provide access to the standardized technologies in order to either analyze 
whether the refusal of a license constitutes a violation, or restore the 
competition if the setting of standards impedes the competition in the 
product/service market. Moreover, the restriction on the participating 
members must be minimal to the extent reasonably necessary to conduct the 
appropriate joint activities for setting standards. The ideal answers to these 
questions under the framework of either the Antimonopoly Law or the 
Japanese civil law system are likely to come through the further analysis that 
will continue in Japan as these activities continue to increase in importance. 
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